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ABSTRACT 
This Article provides an overview of the significant cases that have defined 
state-tribal relations in Alaska as related to Indian child proceedings and 
further discusses various policies that have been implemented over time. After 
outlining these cases and shifting policies, the Article examines the current 
state of the law in Alaska with a focus on State v. Native Village of 
Tanana, which clarified confusion regarding the inherent jurisdiction held by 
federally recognized Alaska Native tribes to initiate the Indian Child Welfare 
Act (ICWA)-defined child custody proceedings. Finally, the Article discusses 
those jurisdictional questions left unresolved by Tanana to be decided at a 
later time under specific factual circumstances. 
INTRODUCTION 
There are 229 federally recognized Alaska Native tribes1 in Alaska, 
including the Native Village of Tanana.2 Most of the lands in and 
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around these villages were conveyed under the Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act (ANCSA).3 In Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal 
Government,4 the United States Supreme Court held that such ANCSA 
lands do not constitute “Indian country” within the meaning of 18 
U.S.C. § 1151.5 As a result, most of the land held by Alaska Native tribes 
is not within a “reservation” as that term is defined in ICWA.6 Such 
tribes are, however, expressly included in ICWA’s definition of an 
“Indian tribe,”7 and many operate their own tribal court systems, which 
typically carry a heavy docket of child-welfare cases.8 
 
 1.  “The term ‘Indian tribe’ means any Indian or Alaska Native tribe, band, 
nation, pueblo, village or community that the Secretary of the Interior 
acknowledges to exist as an Indian Tribe.” 25 U.S.C. § 479a(2) (2006). 
 2.  See 25 U.S.C. §§ 479a-1(a), 479a(2) (2006) (authorizing the Secretary of the 
Interior to publish a list of recognized tribes, including “Alaska Native tribe[s]”); 
Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United 
States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 74 Fed. Reg. 40,218, 40,219, 40,222 (Aug. 11, 
2009) (listing the Native Village of Tanana as a federally recognized tribe that 
has “the immunities and privileges available to other federally acknowledged 
Indian tribes . . . as well as the responsibilities, powers, limitations and 
obligations of such tribes”); Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive 
Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 58 Fed. Reg. 54,364, 
54,366 (Oct. 21, 1993) (noting that Alaska Native tribes have the “right, subject to 
general principles of Federal Indian law, to exercise the same inherent and 
delegated authorities available to other tribes”). 
 3.  See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1613 (2006); see also Alaska Native Claim Settlement 
Act (ANCSA) Land Conveyances, ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME, 
http://www.adfg.alaska.gov/index.cfm?adfg=habitatoversight.ancsa (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2011). 
 4.  522 U.S. 520 (1998). 
 5.  Id. at 532–34; see also DAVID S. CASE & DAVID A. VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES 
AND AMERICAN LAWS 1−33 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing the history and background 
of the federal government’s relationship to Alaska Natives). 
 6.  25 U.S.C. § 1903(10) (2006); see Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit at 4, Hogan v. Kaltag Tribal Council, 131 S. Ct. 66 (2010) 
(No. 09-960). 
 7.  See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(8) (2006). 
 8.  See ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, A DIRECTORY OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN 
ALASKA OUTSIDE FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 47 n.84 (1999). Tanana Chiefs 
provided the following statistics, which compare annual children’s cases 
handled by the region’s twenty-seven tribal courts and councils with state court 
cases from the same village during the period July 1, 1997 to June 30, 1998: 
                           State Tribal 
Children in custody 135 147 
Adoptions finalized 4 9 
Guardianships granted 2 4 
Children returned home 25 86 
Children in foster care to age 4 2 
Average length of foster care 13 months 9 months 
Id. 
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For many years the State of Alaska and Alaska Native tribes sought 
to work cooperatively in recognition of their shared jurisdiction over 
proceedings involving tribal children.9 This cooperative effort was 
encouraged by the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in John v. Baker,10 
which held that Alaska tribes, by virtue of their inherent powers as 
sovereign nations, do possess non-territorial authority to resolve 
domestic disputes, and nothing in the ICWA or Public Law 28011 (P.L. 
280) diminishes this inherent authority.12 Then, in 2004, out of the blue, a 
new Attorney General abruptly reversed course and declared that no 
Alaska tribes possess any original jurisdiction over any children’s 
proceedings absent affirmative reassumption of that jurisdiction 
pursuant to the petitioning process set forth in ICWA § 1918.13 The 
Attorney General buttressed this position by relying on a previous 
ruling, Native Village of Nenana v. State, Department of Health & Social 
Services,14 which held that an ICWA proceeding could not be transferred 
from a state court to a tribal court under ICWA § 1911(b) without the 
tribe first processing a § 1918 petition.15 The court in Nenana further 
observed that a state’s jurisdiction under P.L. 280 is “exclusive” over 
matters involving the custody of Indian children.16 
 
 9.  See LISA JAEGER, TRIBAL COURT DEVELOPMENT: ALASKA TRIBES (3d ed. 
2002), available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/AKtribalct/index.html. 
 10.  982 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1999). 
 11.  Ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified in part as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 
1360 (2006)). The text of P.L. 280 provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Each of the [P.L. 280 States] shall have jurisdiction over civil causes 
of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in 
the areas of Indian country [within the State] . . . to the same extent that 
such State has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those 
civil laws of such State that are of general application to private persons 
or private property shall have the same force and effect within such 
Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State[.] 
. . . 
(c) Any tribal ordinance or custom heretofore or hereafter adopted by 
an Indian tribe, band, or community in the exercise of any authority 
which it may possess shall, if not inconsistent with any applicable civil 
law of the State, be given full force and effect in the determination of 
civil causes of action pursuant to this section. 
28 U.S.C. § 1360 (emphasis added). 
 12.  John, 982 P.2d at 747–48. 
 13.  OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, A.G. FILE NO. 661-04-0467, 
JURISDICTION OF STATE AND TRIBAL COURTS IN CHILD PROTECTION MATTERS (2004) 
[hereinafter RENKES OPINION]. 
 14.  722 P.2d 219 (Alaska 1986), overruled by In re C.R.H., 29 P.3d 849 (Alaska 
2001). 
 15.  Id. at 221−22; RENKES OPINION, supra note 13. 
 16.  722 P.2d at 221. 
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In the wake of the new Attorney General Opinion, the Office of 
Children’s Services (OCS) and Bureau of Vital Statistics (BVS) ceased 
their cooperative practices and adopted new policies to implement the 
turnabout 2004 opinion.17 Because the State’s actions directly 
jeopardized the integrity of virtually all tribal court proceedings in 
Alaska involving tribal children, along with tribal members and others 
who depend upon those proceedings, a lawsuit was brought to confirm 
that Alaska tribes possess inherent original jurisdiction to initiate child 
protection and adoption proceedings in their own tribal courts. In State 
v. Native Village of Tanana,18 the Alaska Supreme Court held that Alaska 
tribes possess inherent sovereign authority to initiate proceedings in 
their tribal courts to protect their tribal children, including adoption and 
child-in-need-of-aid (CINA) type proceedings, and they may exercise 
that inherent authority without first petitioning the Secretary of the 
Interior under § 1918 of ICWA.19 In so ruling, the court expressly 
overruled Nenana and acknowledged: 
[I]n the nearly 25 years since our Nenana decision, our view of 
P.L. 280’s impact on tribal jurisdiction has become the minority 
view—other courts and commentators have instead concluded 
that P.L. 280 merely gives states concurrent jurisdiction with 
tribes in Indian country. What remains of Nenana must now be 
overruled. We adopt the view that P.L. 280 did not divest tribes 
of all jurisdiction under § 1911(a), but rather created concurrent 
jurisdiction with the State.20 
With the express overruling of Nenana, the Tanana decision brings 
state law into conformity with federal pronouncements and removes 
any doubt that “Alaska Native tribes are entitled to all of the rights and 
privileges of Indian tribes under ICWA, including procedural 
safeguards imposed on states and § 1911(d) full faith and credit with 
respect to ICWA-defined child custody orders to the same extent as 
other states’ and foreign orders.”21 
Between 2004 and the 2011 Tanana decision, the State of Alaska 
disputed the existence of concurrent tribal jurisdiction over domestic 
relations matters impacting the welfare of tribal children.22 The State’s 
position relied upon unsettled state decisional law from the 1980s, even 
though those decisions had been reconsidered in the years preceding the 
 
 17.  See State v. Native Vill. of Tanana, 249 P.3d 734, 746−48 (Alaska 2011). 
 18.  Id. at 734. 
 19.  Id. at 751−52. 
 20.  See id. at 751. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  See id. at 746−48. 
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State’s change of position in 2004.23 This Article begins in Part I by 
discussing the two federal statutes that are of greatest relevance to 
Alaska’s Indian child welfare jurisprudence and to the decision in 
Tanana. Then, in Parts II–IV the Article examines the history of confusion 
in Alaska surrounding questions of tribal jurisdiction over child custody 
matters. In Part V, the Article describes how Alaska’s Attorney General 
changed its interpretation of the law and the effects of that change. With 
the historical context in place, the Article then explains the recent Tanana 
decision in Part VI and concludes by discussing remaining ambiguities 
in the law in Part VII. 
I. FEDERAL STATUTES 
A. The Indian Child Welfare Act 
When Congress enacted ICWA in 1978, its goal was to establish 
federal standards that protect the interest of Indian children and ensure 
the stability and security of Indian tribes when Indian children are 
removed from their families.24 It was Congress’ intent that ICWA’s 
provisions should “reflect the unique values of Indian culture.”25 
Congress aimed to provide a framework to assist tribes with child and 
family service programs, not to strip tribes of their governance over 
child custody proceedings.26 
When drafting ICWA, Congress noted that “there is no resource 
that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian 
tribes than their children.”27 Nevertheless, Congress found that non-
tribal public and private agencies were breaking up Indian families by 
the often-unwarranted removal of their children at an alarmingly high 
rate.28 Equally disturbing was the percentage of Indian children who 
were removed from their homes and placed in non-Indian foster and 
adoptive homes and institutions.29 Congress also found that states, when 
exercising jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings, “have 
often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people 
 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Indian Child Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 95-608, § 3, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978) 
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2006)). 
 25.  25 U.S.C. § 1902. 
 26.  See id. 
 27.  See id. § 1901(3). 
 28.  See id. § 1901(4). 
 29.  Id. 
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and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities 
and families.”30 
Responding to these findings and to accomplish its goal, Congress 
established “tribal courts as the required or preferred forum for 
adjudication of Indian child custody proceedings.”31 ICWA defines 
“tribal court,” in relevant part, as “a court with jurisdiction over child 
custody proceedings and which is . . . established and operated under 
the code or custom of an Indian tribe, or any other administrative body 
of a tribe which is vested with authority over child custody 
proceedings.”32 Under ICWA, “child custody proceedings” include 
proceedings of foster care placement, termination of parental rights, pre-
adoptive placement, and adoptive placement.33 ICWA excludes child 
placements as a result of criminal behavior or divorce proceedings,34 but 
generally it otherwise does not distinguish between voluntary and 
involuntary child custody proceedings.35 
Establishing tribal courts as the preferred forum for Indian child 
custody proceedings, ICWA § 1911, titled “Indian Tribe Jurisdiction over 
Indian Child Custody Proceedings,” explicitly limits states’ jurisdiction 
over Indian child custody proceedings.36 First, unless jurisdiction is 
otherwise vested in a state, ICWA § 1911(a) grants tribal courts exclusive 
jurisdiction over “any child custody proceeding involving an Indian 
child who resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe.”37 
Further, ICWA § 1911(a) also provides that tribal courts “retain 
exclusive jurisdiction over tribal court wards regardless of residence or 
domicile.”38 Although ICWA does not define the term “ward,” the court 
in Tanana stated: 
[T]he most commonly accepted understanding of wardship is 
that when a tribal court, or a tribal governing council, has 
exercised legitimate jurisdiction over an Indian child in a child 
 
 30.  Id. § 1901(5). 
 31.  See State v. Native Vill. of Tanana, 249 P.3d 734, 738 (Alaska 2011) 
(quoting CONFERENCE OF W. ATT’YS GEN., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK 571 
(4th ed. 2008)). 
 32.  25 U.S.C. § 1903(12). 
 33.  Id. § 1903(1). 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  See Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1062 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that ICWA-
defined child custody proceedings “definitely encompass[] both voluntary and 
involuntary proceedings”). Some differences between voluntary and 
involuntary proceedings do exist, such as in ICWA’s notice requirements. Id. at 
1062–63. 
 36.  See 25 U.S.C. § 1911; Tanana, 249 P.3d at 738−39. 
 37.  25 U.S.C. § 1911(a). 
 38.  Tanana, 249 P.3d at 739. 
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custody proceeding and continues to exercise that jurisdiction, 
a state court’s exercise of jurisdiction is precluded, except, of 
course, on an emergency basis.39 
Further limiting states’ jurisdictional reach over Indian child 
custody proceedings, ICWA § 1911(b) requires state courts to transfer 
jurisdiction to tribal courts over proceedings involving foster care 
placement or termination of parental rights of an Indian child not 
domiciled or residing in Indian country.40 This must occur upon the 
petition of either parent, the Indian custodian, or the Indian child’s tribe, 
absent certain findings.41 Likewise, ICWA § 1918, titled “Reassumption 
of Jurisdiction over Child Custody Proceedings,” sets forth a process in 
which any tribe may petition the Secretary of the Interior to reassume 
tribal jurisdiction over child custody proceedings that may have been 
transferred to state court.42 Validating tribal court orders and 
jurisdiction, ICWA § 1911(d) mandates that states “give full faith and 
credit to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any Indian 
tribe applicable to Indian child custody proceedings to the same extent 
that such entities give full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and 
judicial proceedings of any other entity.”43 
These provisions regulate state-tribal relations in Alaska because 
ICWA expressly includes Alaska Natives within its definition of 
“Indians” and because Alaska Native villages are expressly recognized 
as “Indian tribes” within the meaning of the Act.44 Almost all of the 
cases discussed below involve an interpretation of the key provisions of 
ICWA. 
B. Public Law No. 83-280 
Public Law 280 (P.L. 280) was enacted in 1953, prior to ICWA. P.L. 
280 transferred criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian lands in five 
states from the federal government to the states and allowed for future 
 
 39.  Id. at 739 n.21 (quoting B.J. JONES, MARK TILDEN & KELLY GAINES-STONER, 
THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT HANDBOOK 58 (2d ed. 2008)). 
 40.  25 U.S.C. § 1911(b). 
 41.  Id. (transferring jurisdiction unless good cause to the contrary is shown, 
objection is raised by either parent, or the tribal court declines such a transfer). 
 42.  Id. § 1918(a) (“Any Indian tribe which became subject to State 
jurisdiction . . . may reassume jurisdiction over child custody proceedings. 
Before any Indian tribe may reassume jurisdiction over Indian child custody 
proceedings, such tribe shall present to the Secretary for approval a petition to 
reassume such jurisdiction which includes a suitable plan to exercise such 
jurisdiction.”). 
 43.  Id. § 1911(d). 
 44.  Id. § 1903(3), (8). 
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assumptions of jurisdictions by all other states.45 Alaska was added to 
the list in 1958.46 Congress passed P.L. 280 to address “the complete 
breakdown of law and order on many of the Indian reservations.”47 The 
Act provided that tribal ordinances and customs not in conflict with 
state law be given “full force and effect” in civil causes of action.48 In 
1976 the Supreme Court held that, although P.L. 280 provided for 
substitution of state for federal judicial forums over some subjects, it did 
not confer state “general civil regulatory powers” over Indian lands.49 
As will be discussed more fully below, in 1986 the Alaska Supreme 
Court interpreted the grant of civil jurisdiction to the states in P.L. 280 as 
depriving tribal courts of concurrent jurisdiction.50 In so holding, Alaska 
law was put on a direct collision course with federal law,51 and they 
would remain at odds until the Tanana decision brought state law fully 
into conformity with federal law. 
II. HISTORY OF SIGNIFICANT CASES: CONFUSION IN THE MID-
1980S 
Throughout the mid-1980s, considerable confusion existed in 
Alaska surrounding the law governing state and tribal court jurisdiction 
over proceedings involving Alaska Native children. Federal and state 
courts were split, both on whether Alaska tribes were federally 
recognized and on whether they possessed inherent authority to 
adjudicate children’s proceedings. 
The Alaska Supreme Court first considered the issue of tribal court 
jurisdiction over child custody proceedings in In re J.M.52 There, a child 
 
 45.  Ch. 505, §§ 2, 4, 67 Stat. 588, 588−89 (1953) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006)). In extending state jurisdiction to 
Indian lands, P.L. 280 expressly exempted from state jurisdiction the alienation, 
encumbrance, or taxation of Indian trust property and the regulation of hunting, 
fishing, and trapping rights protected by treaty, statute, or agreement. Id. 
 46.  Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615, 72 Stat. 545 (amended by Act of 
Nov. 25, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-523, 84 Stat. 1358) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 1162 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006)). 
 47.  State Legal Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Hearings on H.R. 459, H.R. 3235, 
and H.R. 3624 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the H. Comm. on Interior and 
Insular Affairs, 82d Cong. 16 (1952) (statement of Rep. D’Ewart, Member, H. 
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs). 
 48.  § 4, 67 Stat. at 589 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006)). 
 49.  Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373, 389−90 (1976). 
 50.  See Native Vill. of Nenana v. State, Dept. of Health & Soc. Servs., 722 
P.2d 219, 221 (Alaska 1986), overruled by In re C.R.H., 29 P.3d 849 (Alaska 2001); 
see also discussion infra Part II. 
 51.  See Native Vill. of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 559−62 
(9th Cir. 1991). 
 52.  718 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1986). 
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protection proceeding was initiated in tribal court and was then 
transferred to state court based upon an oral, and subsequently written, 
approval by the Tribal Chief.53 The Tribe later filed a motion to dismiss 
the state court proceeding, claiming that the Tribal Chief had acted 
without authority, that the Tribe had exclusive jurisdiction under § 
1911(a) of ICWA,54 and that its jurisdiction had not properly been 
relinquished to the State.55 The Alaska Supreme Court agreed that the 
Chief’s actions did not constitute a sufficiently clear waiver of tribal 
jurisdiction, and therefore, the court directed that the case be remanded 
to the tribal court.56 The court noted that “[t]o imply a waiver of 
jurisdiction would be inconsistent with the ICWA objective of 
encouraging tribal control over custody decisions affecting Indian 
children.”57 
That same year, in Native Village of Nenana v. State, Department of 
Health & Social Services, the Alaska Supreme Court considered whether a 
state court may transfer jurisdiction over an Indian child custody 
proceeding involving an out-of-village child to the child’s tribal court 
under ICWA § 1911(b).58 Interpreting ICWA §§ 1911(b) and 1918(a), the 
court ruled against such transfers, suggesting that tribal courts in Alaska 
had no jurisdiction to adjudicate child custody proceedings.59 In 
addressing this question, the Alaska Supreme Court construed ICWA 
and P.L. 280 and held that the latter effectively divested tribal 
jurisdiction and granted state courts exclusive jurisdiction in children’s 
proceedings.60 In so ruling, the court relied heavily on its reading of 
ICWA § 1918, which mentions P.L. 280. The court concluded that it was 
Congress’ intent that P.L. 280 give states exclusive, rather than 
concurrent, jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings, unless 
and until a tribe petitioned the Secretary of the Interior to reassume 
exclusive jurisdiction and such petition was approved.61 The court 
further held that an Alaska tribe could not exercise transfer jurisdiction 
over ICWA proceedings (securing transfer of cases from state courts 
 
 53.  Id. at 151. 
 54.  Id. at 152. § 1911(a) states in relevant part: “Where an Indian child is a 
ward of a tribal court, the Indian tribe shall retain exclusive jurisdiction, 
notwithstanding the residence or domicile of the child.” 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) 
(2006). 
 55.  J.M., 718 P.2d at 152. 
 56.  Id. at 156. 
 57.  Id. at 155. 
 58.  722 P.2d 219, 220 (Alaska 1986), overruled by In re C.R.H., 29 P.3d 849 
(Alaska 2001). 
 59.  Id. at 222. 
 60.  Id. at 221. 
 61.  Id. 
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under ICWA § 1911(b)) until it successfully petitioned the Secretary of 
the Interior for the right to “reassume” such jurisdiction under ICWA § 
1918(a).62 
In In re K.E., the Alaska Supreme Court again addressed whether a 
tribe could exercise exclusive jurisdiction over child protection matters 
pursuant to § 1911(a).63 The Tribe argued that Nenana did not govern the 
resolution of the case because the Tribe’s jurisdiction was being 
exercised pursuant to § 1911(a)’s provisions governing children 
domiciled with a tribe, rather than the state-to-tribe transfer provision of 
ICWA § 1911(b) at issue in Nenana.64 The court rejected this argument, 
finding: (1) § 1918(a)’s reassumption provision “makes no distinction” 
between the two types of situations; (2) Nenana was the “controlling 
authority”; and (3) “in either case a tribe must present a petition to the 
Secretary” under ICWA § 1918.65 The following year, in Native Village of 
Stevens v. Alaska Management & Planning, the Alaska Supreme Court 
went further and held that Alaska tribes were “not [to] be treated as 
sovereigns.”66 
In the 1990s the Alaska Supreme Court was confronted with a 
growing body of contrary federal court rulings that prompted 
reconsideration of the Nenana-K.E decisions. In In re F.P., the court 
revisited its Nenana holding in light of the intervening Ninth Circuit 
decision in Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska.67 In Venetie, 
the Ninth Circuit had held that tribal jurisdiction survived P.L. 280.68 
The Ninth Circuit explained that the reassumption provision in ICWA § 
1918(a) was designed only to authorize a tribe to enlarge upon the 
inherent and concurrent jurisdiction that had survived P.L. 280, to 
either: (1) re-secure its pre-P.L. 280 exclusive jurisdiction or (2) avail 
itself of ICWA’s mandatory transfer jurisdiction.69 So ruling, the Ninth 
Circuit had upheld the Venetie Tribe’s concurrent jurisdiction over child 
custody proceedings without the need to follow ICWA § 1918(a)’s 
petition procedures.70 
In In re F.P., the Alaska Supreme Court remained unconvinced that 
its Nenana-K.E. approach should be revisited. The court’s principal 
 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  744 P.2d 1173, 1173 (Alaska 1987) (per curiam), overruled by In re C.R.H., 
29 P.3d 849 (Alaska 2001). 
 64.  Id. at 1174. 
 65.  Id. at 1174−75. 
 66.  757 P.2d 32, 34 (Alaska 1988). 
 67.  843 P.2d 1214, 1215−16 (Alaska 1992) (per curiam), overruled by In re 
C.R.H., 29 P.3d 849 (Alaska 2001). 
 68.  944 F.2d 548, 561−62 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 69.  Id.; see also supra Part I.A and discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 70.  See Venetie, 944 F.2d at 561−62. 
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reason for adhering to its prior decisions was that the court in Stevens 
had concluded that there were generally no federally recognized tribes 
in Alaska at all, making discussions about inherent jurisdiction 
academic.71 Although the court was not yet prepared to revisit Stevens, 
Chief Justice Rabinowitz was persuaded by the Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning in Venetie.72 In his dissent, he argued that Nenana and K.E. 
should be overruled based on the reasoning that P.L. 280 leaves tribal 
court jurisdiction intact, so that its extension of jurisdiction to states 
leaves tribes with concurrent adjudicatory jurisdiction.73 Although the 
Chief Justice represented the minority view in F.P., later developments 
vindicated his view. 
III. FEDERAL RECOGNITION OF ALASKA’S TRIBES 
A. All Federal Branches Recognize Tribes in Alaska 
Nenana, K.E., and Stevens put pressure on the federal government to 
clarify the status of Alaska tribes. In the ensuing years the Executive 
Branch,74 Congress,75 and the federal courts76 all expressly confirmed 
that Alaska’s tribes are federally recognized sovereigns with inherent 
sovereign authority to adjudicate children’s proceedings. This express 
recognition of Alaska tribes by the federal government put the State of 
Alaska in what it called an “untenable” position: 
[T]he conflict between [the Alaska Supreme Court’s] rulings in 
[Nenana] and its progeny, and the decision of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in [Venetie] has left the 
 
 71.  843 P.2d at 1215 (“Congress intended that most Alaska Native groups 
not be treated as sovereigns.” (quoting Stevens, 757 P.2d at 34)). 
 72.  See id. at 1216 (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting). 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the 
United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 68 Fed. Reg. 68,180, 68,180−84 (Dec. 5, 
2003) (listing federally recognized tribes); Indian Entities Recognized and 
Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 67 
Fed. Reg. 46,328, 46,328−33 (July 12, 2002); Indian Entities Recognized and 
Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 65 
Fed. Reg. 13,298, 13,299−302 (Mar. 13, 2000); Indian Entities Recognized and 
Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 60 
Fed. Reg. 9250, 9251−55 (Feb. 16, 1995); Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible 
to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 58 Fed. Reg. 
54,364, 54,366−69 (Oct. 21, 1993). 
 75.  See Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994, 25 U.S.C. § 479a-
1 (2006); see also supra note 2. 
 76.  See, e.g., Native Vill. of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548 
(9th Cir. 1991) (holding Alaska Native Villages that are modern-day successors 
to sovereign historical bands of natives may grant adoptions of children). 
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State in an untenable position. On the one hand, it must abide by 
the law of this state as determined by this court; on the other, 
its failure to follow the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation as it 
relates to any villages other than those involved in [Venetie] has 
resulted in repeated suits filed by tribes in federal court, 
challenging the State’s inability to recognize tribal court orders. 
These suits have tied up the lives of the affected persons, particularly 
delaying permanent placements for children, and have diverted state 
resources from necessary state services. The State wants to 
cooperate more closely with tribes, avoiding duplicative 
programs and stretching our combined resources further than 
either could manage separately, particularly in the under-
served regions of Alaska.77 
The result was a dramatic shift in state court jurisprudence. 
B. The Alaska Supreme Court Decision in John v. Baker 
John v. Baker involved a custody dispute between two parents.78 In 
its landmark decision in this case, the Alaska Supreme Court addressed 
whether tribal courts possess jurisdiction over non-ICWA child custody 
cases arising outside of Indian country.79 Since the case did not involve 
ICWA, it was not controlled by the express “Alaska” provisions 
contained in ICWA’s definitional sections. The case therefore squarely 
presented the question of whether inherent tribal sovereignty existed in 
Alaska at all, together with the question of whether Alaska tribes 
possess original jurisdiction to adjudicate child custody disputes in their 
own courts.80 This time, the court was persuaded to follow federal law, 
accepting that Alaska tribes were federally recognized sovereign entities 
(thereby reversing Stevens) and embracing the core premise “that tribal 
sovereignty, with respect to issues of tribal self-governance, exists unless 
divested.”81 In its ensuing analysis, the court explained: 
Congress has recognized that a tribe has a strong interest in 
“preserving and protecting the Indian family as the wellspring 
of its own future.” Because [the] Village’s status as a federally 
recognized tribe is undisputed and its adjudication of child 
custody disputes over member children is necessary “to protect 
 
 77.  Amicus Brief of the State of Alaska at 1, John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738 
(Alaska 1999) (No. S-8099), 1998 WL 35180190, at *1 (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted).  
 78.  982 P.2d 738, 743 (Alaska 1999). 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. at 752. 
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tribal self-government or to control internal relations,” its tribal 
courts require no express congressional delegation of the right to 
determine custody of tribal children.82 
The court then evaluated federal statutes affecting Alaska Natives, 
including both ICWA and P.L. 280, to determine whether Congress 
explicitly revoked the inherent sovereignty that Alaska Native tribes 
possess.83 With respect to ICWA, the court observed that: 
ICWA’s goal was to increase tribal control over custody 
decisions involving tribal children. Congress viewed this 
increased control as vital to the continued sovereignty of the 
tribes. In the legislative history to ICWA, Congress cited with 
approval a decision stating that “there can be no greater threat 
to ‘essential tribal relations,’ and no greater infringement on the 
right of the . . . tribe to govern themselves than to interfere with 
tribal control over the custody of their children.” Alaska Native 
villages are explicitly included within ICWA’s scope. 
  ICWA’s very structure presumes both that the tribes covered 
by the Act are capable of adjudicating child custody matters in 
their own courts and that tribal justice systems are appropriate 
forums for resolution of child custody disputes. Indeed, 
legislative history reveals that ICWA’s jurisdictional 
framework was motivated by concerns over the “failure of 
State officials, agencies, and procedures to take into account the 
special problems and circumstances of Indian families . . . .”84 
Although the custody dispute in question in John fell outside of 
ICWA’s scope, the court found significant that “Congress’s purpose in 
enacting ICWA reveals its intent that Alaska Native villages retain their 
power to adjudicate child custody disputes.”85 
With respect to P.L. 280, the court noted that this enactment only 
has relevance in “Indian country.”86 The court then reasoned that since 
there is little “Indian country” in Alaska after Alaska v. Native Village of 
Venetie Tribal Government,87 P.L. 280 “has limited application in 
Alaska.”88 That is, if a village does not occupy “Indian country . . . P.L. 
280 has no direct relevance” to its jurisdiction.89 Although this statement 
 
 82.  Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 83.  Id. at 753. 
 84.  Id. at 753−54 (citations omitted). 
 85.  Id. at 754. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  522 U.S. 520 (1998) (holding that lands conveyed to Alaska Natives 
under ANCSA do not constitute Indian country). 
 88.  John, 982 P.2d at 747. 
 89.  Id. at 748. 
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appeared to overrule much of the court’s earlier reasoning in Nenana, the 
court’s failure to say so left Nenana’s continuing vitality unknown. 
The Alaska Supreme Court next assessed whether Alaska tribes 
retain non-territorial sovereignty that includes original jurisdiction over 
child custody disputes, given the absence of “Indian country” and the 
intervening ANSCA.90 Carefully reviewing United States Supreme 
Court precedent, the court concluded that “the nature of tribal 
sovereignty stems from two intertwined sources: tribal membership and 
tribal land.”91 The court reasoned that membership-based jurisdiction 
exists irrespective of a tribal territory (or “Indian country”) and includes 
the power to adjudicate internal child custody disputes.92 
After holding that tribal sovereign status, alone, includes the power 
to adjudicate matters involving the welfare of tribal children, the court 
affirmed tribal court jurisdiction and concluded that Alaska’s state 
courts, correspondingly, retain concurrent (but not exclusive) 
jurisdiction over such matters.93 
C. The State’s Response and Continued Confusion 
In the year following the Alaska Supreme Court’s holding in John, 
then-Governor Knowles issued Administrative Order 186.94 Governor 
Knowles acknowledged the legal and political existence of Alaska’s 
federally-recognized tribes, and he directed Alaska’s Executive Branch 
to work thereafter on a government-to-government basis with Alaska’s 
tribes as sovereigns.95 In doing so, Governor Knowles “acknowledged 
the value of the ‘services that Alaska’s [t]ribes contribute to the state’s 
economic and social well-being by virtue of their direct [t]ribal authority 
and responsibility for the delivery of social, economic, cultural, and 
other programs and services.’”96 The order further “committed the State 
 
 90.  Id. at 754. 
 91.  Id. (citing United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)). 
 92.  Id. at 754. The court noted that federal case law supports the court’s 
conclusion that “federal tribes derive the power to adjudicate internal domestic 
matters, including child custody disputes over tribal children, from a source of 
sovereignty independent of the land they occupy.” Id. 
 93.  Id. at 759−60. 
 94.  Administrative Order No. 186, Sept. 29, 2000, 
http://gov.state.ak.us/admin-orders/186.html; see generally CASE & VOLUCK, 
supra note 5, at 430−31 & n.409 (describing Governor Knowles’s actions and 
noting change from former policy). 
 95.  Administrative Order No. 186, supra note 94. 
 96.  State v. Native Vill. of Tanana, 249 P.3d 734, 744 (Alaska 2011) 
(alterations in original) (quoting Administrative Order No. 186, supra note 94). 
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‘to working with [t]ribes to further strengthen Alaska’s ability to meet 
the needs of Alaska’s communities and families.’”97 
Despite these developments, some confusion over Alaska’s ability 
to coordinate with tribes continued to exist. Such confusion persisted 
primarily due to the fact that the Alaska Supreme Court in John never 
directly overruled Nenana: Nenana was an ICWA case, whereas the 
specific issue in John was whether the Tribe possessed inherent original 
jurisdiction to adjudicate inter-parental custody disputes and thus was 
not a “child custody proceeding.”98 Further, while P.L. 280 was central 
in Nenana, it was deemed irrelevant in John.99 
IV. ALASKA SUPREME COURT OVERRULES NENANA IN IN RE 
C.R.H. 
Two years later, in In re C.R.H., the Alaska Supreme Court was 
squarely faced with its prior ICWA holdings.100 There, the State opposed 
a motion made under ICWA § 1911(b) to transfer a child custody 
proceeding from state court to tribal court.101 The State explained that its 
opposition to the transfer stemmed from the fact that, despite the State’s 
own earlier request in John that the court overrule Nenana and similar 
cases, the court had not yet done so.102 Therefore, the State argued, it 
was “constrained, as is this court, to follow [those cases] until the Alaska 
Supreme Court overrules these decisions.”103 The State then filed a brief 
urging the Alaska Supreme Court to confirm that Alaska tribes could 
hear cases transferred from state court to tribal court without the tribes 
first petitioning the Secretary to “reassume” such jurisdiction under 
ICWA § 1918.104 The Alaska Supreme Court agreed. 
A. The Alaska Supreme Court’s Holding in In re C.R.H. 
First, the court in In re C.R.H. explicitly overruled the actual 
holding of Nenana and its progeny and upheld the right of Alaska tribes 
to secure transfer jurisdiction under ICWA § 1911(b), irrespective of any 
 
 97.  Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Administrative Order No. 186, supra 
note 94). 
 98.  John, 982 P.2d at 746. 
 99.  Id. at 747. 
 100.  29 P.3d 849 (Alaska 2001). 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. at 851. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Appellee State of Alaska’s Brief at 8−32, In re C.R.H., 29 P.3d 849 (Alaska 
2001) (No. S-9677). 
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reassumption of jurisdiction under ICWA § 1918.105 Second, the court in 
C.R.H. rejected Nenana’s analytic linkage between P.L. 280 and a tribe’s 
membership-based (and non-Indian country) concurrent jurisdiction 
over child custody cases.106 Instead, the court held that ICWA § 1911(b) 
transfer jurisdiction, by its own terms, authorizes transfer of jurisdiction 
to tribal courts regardless of P.L. 280: 
[ICWA’s] language makes clear [that] Congress intended P.L. 
280 to affect tribes’ exclusive jurisdiction under subsection 
1911(a), but did not intend P.L. 280 to affect transfer 
jurisdiction under subsection 1911(b). Subsection 1911(a) grants 
tribes exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving children who 
reside on reservations “except where such jurisdiction is otherwise 
vested in the State by existing Federal law” such as P.L. 280. With 
this qualifying language, Congress recognized P.L. 280 as a 
limitation on exclusive tribal jurisdiction. By contrast, in 
subsection 1911(b), Congress did not articulate a P.L. 280 
exception to tribal transfer jurisdiction. Rather, it provided that 
“in any State court proceeding . . . the court, in the absence of 
good cause to the contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to the 
jurisdiction of the tribe.” Subsection 1911(b) therefore 
authorizes transfer to tribal courts regardless of whether or 
how P.L. 280 otherwise affects the tribes’ jurisdiction.107 
From this perspective, the court affirmed that the burden of 
establishing good cause to deny transfer jurisdiction rests on the party 
opposing the transfer, observing that: 
The good cause exception—like the comity analysis discussed 
in John v. Baker—”is not an invitation for our courts to deny 
recognition to tribal [courts] based on paternalistic notions of 
proper procedure. . . . [S]uperior courts should strive to respect 
the cultural differences that influence tribal jurisprudence, as 
well as to recognize the practical limits experienced by smaller 
court systems.”108 
 
 105.  C.R.H., 29 P.3d at 850 (“We overrule Nenana and subsequent decisions 
affirming its holding to the extent that those cases are inconsistent with today’s 
decision.”). 
 106.  Id. at 852 (“The language and structure of section 1911 reflect 
congressional intent that all tribes, regardless of their P.L. 280 status, be able to 
accept transfer jurisdiction of ICWA cases from state courts.”). 
 107.  Id. at 852−53 (citations omitted). 
 108.  Id. at 854 (alterations in original) (quoting John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 
763 (Alaska 1999)). 
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In sum, John and C.R.H. upheld several fundamental propositions 
that directly overruled Nenana and its progeny: (1) Alaska tribes are 
inherent sovereigns possessed with original jurisdiction over their 
members;109 (2) tribal status gives rise to membership-based jurisdiction 
that does not require tribal territory;110 (3) the original jurisdiction of 
tribes over their members includes the power to adjudicate matters 
relating to their members;111 (4) tribal authority over members continues 
unless explicitly extinguished by Congress (and such extinguishment 
did not occur in ANCSA or in ICWA);112 (5) P.L. 280 extends only to 
“Indian country” within the state;113 and (6) outside Indian country, 
which is to say in most of Alaska, state courts have concurrent, but not 
exclusive, jurisdiction with tribes over children’s proceedings involving 
tribal children.114 
B. The Effect of In re C.R.H. 
Responding to these rapid developments in Alaska Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, Alaska’s Department of Health and Social Services 
(DHSS) requested an opinion from then-Attorney General Bruce Botelho 
regarding the effect of C.R.H.115 Responding to this request, the Alaska 
Department of Law issued a memorandum explaining that C.R.H. had 
overruled Nenana and its progeny.116 The Department of Law added: 
“Thus, state law now recognizes that tribes in Alaska have authority 
over child custody matters involving tribal children and need not 
petition the Secretary of the Interior to reassume jurisdiction before 
exercising their authority.”117 The memorandum explained that “the 
State was required to ‘recognize tribal court adoption orders to the 
 
 109.  John, 982 P.2d at 750−52; C.R.H., 29 P.3d at 851 n.5. 
 110.  John, 982 P.2d at 754−59 (holding Alaska Tribes retain fundamental, 
sovereign power to adjudicate “internal family law affairs” like “child custody”). 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. at 753. 
 113.  Id. at 747; C.R.H., 29 P.3d at 851, 852 & n.9. 
 114.  John, 982 P.2d at 759−61, 765. In terms of retained original tribal 
sovereignty, there is no meaningful distinction between custody contests as 
between parents, and jurisdiction over “child custody proceedings” such as 
those covered by ICWA; both categories of cases involve the welfare of member 
children and fall within tribal subject matter jurisdiction. In both situations, 
tribal jurisdiction is necessary “to protect tribal self-government or to control 
internal relations.” Id. at 752. 
 115.  Memorandum from Assistant Att’y Gen. Donna Goldsmith for Jay 
Livey, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs. Comm’r 1 (Mar. 29, 2002) (No. 441-00-0005) 
[hereinafter Goldsmith Memorandum], revoked by RENKES OPINION, supra note 13. 
 116.  Id. at 5. 
 117.  Id. at 1−2. 
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extent that it recognize[d] such orders from sister states and other 
foreign orders’ because ‘C.R.H. removed all impediments that 
historically prevented [recognition of] tribal court adoptions.’”118 
Simultaneously, the State settled a lawsuit brought against it by the 
Sitka Tribe and two parents who had adopted a child in that tribe’s 
court.119 In the settlement’s Conclusions of Law, the State stipulated in 
paragraph two that the Sitka Tribe “has jurisdiction over custody cases 
arising under the Indian Child Welfare Act despite the facts that the 
Tribe has not petitioned for reassumption of jurisdiction over Indian 
child custody proceedings under ICWA § 1918 and did not acquire the 
case by transfer from state court.”120 The State also acknowledged that 
“§ 1918 does not affect the obligation of the state to give full faith and 
credit to the judicial proceedings of an Indian tribe applicable to Indian 
child custody proceedings covered by the Indian Child Welfare Act.”121 
Consistent with these developments, the DHSS Office of Children’s 
Services (OCS) adopted a policy for sharing non-emergency reports of 
harm with a tribe when the tribe had an ongoing child protection case.122  
V. THE RENKES OPINION AND ITS ABRUPT SHIFT IN POLICY 
In fall of 2004, DHSS policy and protocol abruptly changed. On 
October 1, 2004, the new Attorney General, Gregg Renkes, issued an 
opinion (Renkes Opinion) expressly revoking the 2002 Department of 
Law Memorandum.123 Relying on Nenana, the Renkes Opinion 
concluded that, notwithstanding C.R.H., Alaska state courts continue to 
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over child custody proceedings involving 
Alaska Native children and that Alaska Native tribes do not possess any 
jurisdiction to hear children’s cases unless (1) the child’s tribe has 
successfully petitioned the Secretary of the Interior to reassume 
jurisdiction under ICWA § 1918, or (2) an Alaska Superior Court judge 
has transferred jurisdiction over a child’s case to a tribal court in 
accordance with ICWA § 1911(b).124 Absent these circumstances, the 
 
 118.  State v. Native Vill. of Tanana, 249 P.3d 734, 746 (Alaska 2011) 
(alterations in original) (quoting Goldsmith Memorandum, supra note 115, at 5). 
 119.  Sitka Tribe of Alaska v. State, No. 1SI-01-61 CI (Apr. 1, 2002) (agreeing 
that the DHSS Bureau of Vital Statistics would issue new birth certificates to 
honor tribal-court adoptions). 
 120.  Id. at 5. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Cf. Tanana, 249 P.3d at 747 (describing the changes to previous OCS 
protocols). 
 123.  See RENKES OPINION, supra note 13, at 2 n.3. 
 124.  Id. The Renkes Opinion simply ignored the State’s own contrary 
representations in its John v. Baker amicus brief and in the Sitka Tribe settlement, 
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Renkes Opinion concluded that tribal court decrees are not entitled to 
full faith and credit under ICWA: “full faith and credit is not due to 
tribal court adoption decrees because Alaska tribal courts have no 
subject matter jurisdiction over Indian child adoptions.”125 
Continuing the about-face in state policy, the Renkes Opinion 
directed state social workers to stop sharing confidential information 
with tribes in children’s cases and to investigate all reports of harm the 
State received pertaining to Alaska Native children, irrespective of a 
tribe’s claim of exclusive jurisdiction under an established tribal court 
wardship order.126 The Renkes Opinion cautioned that only two Alaska 
tribes (the Native Villages of Barrow and Chevak) were currently 
approved to exercise ICWA jurisdiction over child custody proceedings 
because they had submitted to the ICWA § 1918 reassumption petition 
process.127 OCS was expressly instructed to obey the guidance provided 
in the Renkes Opinion and to draft regulations consistent with that 
opinion.128 
Complying with these instructions, OCS deleted section 2.1.3 B of 
the OCS Policy and Procedure Manual, which governed the protocol for 
handling non-emergency reports of harm when a tribe has an ongoing 
child protection case. In contrast to the 2002 edition of the OCS Manual, 
which stated that “until a child custody proceeding is initiated, ‘the tribe 
and the [S]tate simultaneously share authority and either government 
may take the steps necessary to protect a child who may be at risk[,]’ the 
2004 edition removed that provision and otherwise limited concurrent 
jurisdiction to cases transferred from state court.”129 Further, OCS 
altered the manner in which information was shared between the State 
and tribes. Prior to the Renkes Opinion, “OCS contacted a child’s tribe 
‘[a]s soon as possible, and if possible, prior to the assignment for 
investigation’ to ascertain whether the tribe already had custody of the 
child or wanted to take jurisdiction over a child protection 
 
and it only hinted at the position the State took in the C.R.H. appeal. Id. at 6 
(“Although urged to do so by the parties, the court in C.R.H. did not hold that 
tribes in Alaska retain concurrent jurisdiction with the state in child protection 
matters involving Indian children.” (first emphasis added)). Its single peripheral 
reference to John v. Baker failed to mention that case’s central holding about tribal 
inherent jurisdiction over tribal children. Id. at 28 n.75. 
 125.  Id. at 30. 
 126.  Id. at 5. 
 127.  Id. at 11 n.23. 
 128.  Id. at 31. 
 129.  State v. Native Vill. of Tanana, 249 P.3d 734, 746−47 (Alaska 2011) (first 
alteration in original) (quoting the OCS Policy and Procedure Manual). When 
revising its manual, OCS cited the Renkes Opinion as authority. Id. at 746. 
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proceeding.”130 After the Renkes Opinion, OCS only released 
information to a tribe if the tribe was considered to be properly 
exercising its jurisdiction and if state court proceedings had yet to be 
initiated.131 The changes that took place were described by one OCS 
supervisor this way: 
Policies have changed recently regarding when we contact the 
tribe in investigations . . . . [W]e don’t share information 
regarding investigations unless the investigation is underway. 
In other words, . . . the tribe can’t have access to allegations that 
are made unless I have releases from my clients. They can’t get 
copies of Reports of Harm unless . . . the parent in the Report of 
Harm has signed a release. Until [the tribes] have intervened 
legally in a [child in need of aid] case. In which case, then, they 
get all that.132 
In addition to OCS, BVS also changed its policies and procedures to 
conform to the Renkes Opinion. For example: 
According to a letter from BVS to the Kaltag Tribal Council, 
BVS began refusing to accept tribal court adoption paperwork 
in October 2005 unless it was from Native Village of Barrow, 
Native Village of Chevak, or Metlakatla Indian Community, 
and it began processing only cultural adoptions for the 
remaining tribes.133 
In the wake of the State’s abrupt reversal of policy, tribes and their 
individual members across Alaska suffered immediate impacts.134 First, 
the changes created a cloud of uncertainty over numerous tribal court 
placements of children.135 Second, the Renkes Opinion increased 
jurisdictional conflict among tribal and state authorities. This 
uncertainty was felt by all Indian children in child custody proceedings 
and their adoptive parents.136 Typical was the case of one member child 
of the Kenaitze Tribe, as discussed by the Court in Tanana: 
The child had been: (1) the subject of several emergency 
petitions before the Tribe; (2) the subject of multiple reports of 
harm OCS had transferred to the Tribe for follow-up; and (3) 
held by a state court to be under the tribal court’s jurisdiction. 
 
 130.  Id. at 747 (quoting the OCS Policy and Procedure Manual). 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. (alterations in original). 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  See id. at 749. 
 135.  See id. 
 136.  Id. 
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OCS disregarded this previous activity and reopened its 
investigation, requesting a state court order compelling the 
child’s attendance at an interview regarding allegations the 
Tribe had already investigated and found unsubstantiated.137 
Similarly, when tribal court workers requested birth certificates 
from BVS, they were told that the State no longer recognized tribal court 
jurisdiction, and therefore birth certificates would not be issued unless 
done pursuant to the procedures developed for cultural adoptions.138 
Furthermore, when tribal court administrators requested information 
from OCS personnel concerning certain children, the requests were 
denied on the basis that the State no longer recognizes tribal court 
authority in Alaska.139 
VI. KALTAG AND TANANA LITIGATION 
A. Federal and State Suits Challenging the Renkes Opinion and Its 
Policies 
Shortly after the Renkes Opinion and its policy changes went into 
effect, a suit was brought in state court on behalf of the Native Village of 
Tanana, Nulato Village, the Village of Kalskag, the Akiak Native 
Community, the Village of Lower Kalskag, and the Kenaitze Indian 
Tribe.140 Each of the Tribes have active tribal courts that exercise original 
jurisdiction over member children on the basis of their inherent 
sovereign authority, and none had petitioned the Secretary of the 
Interior to reassume exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to ICWA § 1918.141 
In addition to the Tribes, a suit was also brought on behalf of Dan and 
Theresa Schwietert (the Schwieterts), a non-Native couple who adopted 
 
 137.  Id. at 749 n.118 (referencing the Tribes’ argument that there is a real case 
and controversy ripe for adjudication based on the facts that in response to the 
Renkes Opinion, OCS changed its policy, and the record reflects the application 
of the new policy). 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  See id. at 748 (“Indian children may be at risk of harm because of the 
State’s refusal to coordinate and cooperate with tribes regarding reports of harm; 
Indian children, as well as their natural and putative adoptive parents, may be 
held in legal limbo by the State’s refusal to give full faith and credit to tribal 
adoption decrees; and both the State and tribal courts need to understand the 
extent to which tribal court orders in ‘child custody proceedings,’ as the term is 
defined in ICWA, are entitled to full faith and credit.”). 
 140.  Id. at 736. 
 141.  Id. at 736, 739 n.24. 
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a special-needs Alaska Native child through the Tanana Tribal Court in 
June 2004 and who received a birth certificate from the State.142 
The Tribes and the Schwieterts sought a declaratory judgment that 
Alaska tribes possess inherent sovereign authority over the domestic 
relations of their tribal members and therefore possess adjudicatory 
jurisdiction, concurrent with the State, over children’s proceedings 
without first petitioning the Secretary of the Interior under ICWA § 
1918.143 In 2005, Superior Court Judge Suddock denied the State’s 
motion to dismiss on ripeness grounds, stating: 
[T]he tribal courts are behaving as if they have original 
jurisdiction in these matters. They are actually adjudicating 
them and they are placing children based on them and the 
[S]tate is here saying . . . [“]that’s void. Those courts are [a] 
nullity. Any of those parents could go get those children back 
and not be in violation of a binding court order because it’s 
void ab initio.[“] Strikes me that that’s a bad situation, that 
there is a very ripe question for a review: whether or not the 
Attorney General ever put pencil to paper . . . there is a 
network of tribal courts out there that has assumed a 
jurisdiction beyond . . . what the [S]tate contends is proper. 
Ordinary citizens are being affected. Children are being 
affected. It seems that there is a ripe question for declaratory 
judgment.144 
On August 26, 2008, Superior Court Judge Tan issued a declaratory 
judgment in favor of the Tribes and the Schwieterts, after which the 
State of Alaska appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court.145 
While the Tanana state court case was proceeding, the Kaltag Tribal 
Council and Hudson and Salina Sam (the Sams) filed suit in federal 
district court challenging the State of Alaska’s refusal to recognize the 
Sams’ adoption decree from the Kaltag Tribal Court.146 Kaltag and the 
Sams sought a judgment that the State was required to give full faith 
 
 142.  Id. at 736 n.6. 
 143.  Id. at 736. 
 144.  Id. at 737 (alterations in original) (quoting Superior Court Judge John 
Suddock denying the State’s dismissal motion from the bench in March 2005). 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Kaltag Tribal Council v. Jackson, No. 3:06-cv-00211-TMB, at 1 (D. Alaska 
filed Feb. 22, 2008) (“As of October 25, 2005, the Bureau [of Vital Statistics] will 
only be accepting Tribal Court granted adoption paperwork from the following 
3 entities: Barrow, Chevak, and Metlakatla. All other tribal entities will need to 
submit the Cultural Adoption packet in order for the Bureau to process the 
adoption.” (quoting letter to Kaltag Tribal Council from the Bureau of Vital 
Statistics refusing to recognize the Sams’ adoption decree made by the Tribe’s 
court)), aff’d, 344 Fed. App’x 324 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 66 (2010). 
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and credit to the Kaltag Tribal Court’s adoption decree pursuant to 
ICWA’s full faith and credit clause.147 Like the Ninth Circuit some 
twenty years earlier in Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska,148 
the federal district court agreed.149 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
that Indian country or reservation status is not a requirement for a tribe 
to exercise member-based jurisdiction because a “Tribe’s authority over 
its reservation or Indian country is incidental to its authority over its 
members.”150 The State of Alaska’s petition for certiorari was denied by 
the United States Supreme Court on October 4, 2010.151 
B. The Alaska Supreme Court’s Holding in State v. Native Village of 
Tanana 
On March 4, 2011, the Alaska Supreme Court issued its decision in 
the Tanana case. In a carefully written opinion, the court addressed two 
issues: (1) whether the inherent sovereign jurisdiction of Alaska Native 
tribes recognized in John v. Baker includes the initiation of “child custody 
proceedings” as the term is used in ICWA; and (2) if so, whether those 
proceedings are entitled to full faith and credit by the State.152 
The Alaska Supreme Court began its analysis by reviewing ICWA, 
Alaska and federal case law regarding Alaska Native tribal sovereignty 
over ICWA-defined “child custody proceedings,” John v. Baker, and the 
State’s reaction to John v. Baker both prior to and after October 1, 2004.153 
After reviewing John v. Baker’s tribal jurisdiction analysis, the court 
reiterated four main points to “set the stage for . . . consideration of the 
State’s arguments.”154 First, the court acknowledged that, absent an 
explicit divestment by Congress, all federally recognized tribes retain 
sovereignty and inherent authority “to regulate internal domestic 
relations among [their] members.”155 Second, although ANSCA 
eliminated nearly all Indian country in Alaska, it “did not divest 
federally-recognized sovereign Alaska Native tribes of their authority to 
 
 147.  Id. at 5. 
 148.  944 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 149.  Kaltag, No. 3:06-cv-00211-TMB, at 12 (“The Kaltag court’s adoption 
orders are entitled to full faith and credit, and the Bureau [of Vital Statistics] 
shall grant said status to the adoption order by issuing the Sams a substitute 
birth certificate.”). 
 150.  Kaltag Tribal Council v. Jackson, 344 F. App’x 324, 325 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Venetie, 944 F.2d at 559 n.12), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 66 (2010). 
 151.  Hogan v. Kaltag Tribal Council, 131 S. Ct. 66 (2010). 
 152.  State v. Native Vill. of Tanana, 249 P.3d 734, 735 (Alaska 2011). 
 153.  Id. at 738. 
 154.  Id. at 750. 
 155.  Id. (citing John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 751 (Alaska 1999)). 
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regulate internal domestic relations among their members.”156 Third, 
ambiguities in statutes that affect the rights of Native Americans must 
be construed in favor of Native Americans and the court “will not 
lightly find that Congress intended to eliminate the sovereign powers of 
Alaska tribes.”157 Fourth, Congress enacted ICWA with the intent that 
“‘Alaska Native villages retain their power to adjudicate child custody 
disputes’ and ‘ICWA’s very structure presumes both that the tribes . . . 
are capable of adjudicating child custody matters . . . and that tribal 
justice systems are appropriate forums for resolution of child custody 
disputes.’”158 
After reiterating these four fundamental principles, the court 
addressed the State’s argument that ICWA § 1911 constitutes a 
“complete jurisdictional scheme” reflecting “Congress’[s] reasonable 
balancing of tribal rights, parental rights off-reservation, and state rights 
off-reservation.”159 From the State’s perspective, the acknowledgment of 
inherent sovereign jurisdiction to initiate child custody proceedings: 
(1) fundamentally upend[s] ICWA’s delicate balance of 
parental, state, and tribal interests; (2) circumvents transfer 
jurisdiction limitations; (3) allows tribes to exercise jurisdiction 
over non-members; and (4) magnifies the disjunction in Indian 
law that P.L. 280 may have divested Alaska Native tribal 
powers inside Indian country but not outside.160 
Rejecting the State’s claims, the court agreed with the Tribes that 
“ICWA creates limitations on states’ jurisdiction over ICWA-defined 
child custody proceedings, not limitations on tribes’ jurisdiction over 
those proceedings.”161 The court then expressly overruled what 
remained of its earlier holding in Nenana.162 In so doing the court 
acknowledged: 
In the nearly 25 years since our Nenana decision, our view of 
P.L. 280’s impact on tribal jurisdiction has become the minority 
view—other courts and commentators have instead concluded 
that P.L. 280 merely gives states concurrent jurisdiction with 
tribes in Indian country. What remains of Nenana must now be 
overruled.163  
 
 156.  Id. (citing John, 982 P.2d at 753). 
 157.  Id. (quoting John, 982 P.2d at 753−54). 
 158.  Id. (alterations in original) (quoting John, 982 P.2d at 753−54). 
 159.  Id. (alteration in original). 
 160.  Id. at 750−51 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 161.  Id. at 751. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. 
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 The court then adopted the position that P.L. 280 did not divest 
Alaska Native tribes of their jurisdiction under ICWA § 1911(a) but 
instead created concurrent jurisdiction with the state.164 Further, the 
court held that “federally recognized Alaska Native tribes that have not 
reassumed exclusive jurisdiction under [ICWA] § 1918(a) still have 
concurrent jurisdiction to initiate ICWA-defined child custody 
proceedings, both inside and outside of Indian country.”165 Upon this 
foundation, the Alaska Supreme Court recognized the inherent 
sovereignty of Alaska Native tribes, entitled to all rights and privileges 
granted in ICWA, including procedural due process safeguards imposed 
on states.166 Accordingly, the court held that ICWA’s full faith and credit 
clause mandates that the State recognize all Alaska Native tribal court 
orders in ICWA-defined child custody proceedings in the same manner 
that the State gives full faith and credit to orders of other state courts 
and foreign courts.167 
The Tanana decision brings a welcome level of clarity to an area 
that had been hotly contested for over two decades. But, the court was 
careful to limit its decision to the facts before it, and it declined to 
address additional issues concerning tribal jurisdiction over 
nonmembers.168 
VII. REMAINING AMBIGUITIES IN THE LAW 
In its briefing, the State requested that the court delineate 
limitations on an Alaska Native tribe’s inherent jurisdiction over child 
custody proceedings when the proceeding touches upon the rights of 
parents who are either non-Native or who are Native but members of 
another tribe. The court declined the invitation but noted that the nature 
and extent of tribal jurisdiction in any particular case will be based upon 
the following factors: “(1) the extent of the federal recognition of a 
particular tribe as sovereign; (2) the extent of the tribe’s authority under 
its organic laws; (3) the tribe’s delegation of authority to its tribal court; 
 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (2006) (requiring notice to Indian tribes); id. 
§ 1911(b) (providing Indian tribes with right to petition for transfer to tribal 
court); id. § 1911(c) (providing Indian tribes with right to intervene); JONES, 
TILDEN & GAINES-STONER, supra note 39, at 83−111). 
 167.  Id. at 751 & n.129 (citing John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 761−62 (Alaska 
1999) (“ICWA requires courts to extend full faith and credit to tribal court 
decisions involving ‘child custody proceedings’ as that term is defined by 
[ICWA].”)). 
 168.  Id. at 749. 
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and (4) the proper exercise of subject matter and personal 
jurisdiction.”169 Noting that it did not have sufficient facts before it to 
make such determinations, the court left those questions to be addressed 
another day in the context of specific factual scenarios.170 
The court specifically stated: 
Among the many issues we are not deciding today are: (1) 
whether, parallel to ICWA § 1911(b) transfer jurisdiction 
limitations, parents of Indian children might have the right to 
object to tribal jurisdiction; (2) the extent of tribal jurisdiction 
over non-member parents of Indian children; and (3) the extent 
of tribal jurisdiction over Indian children or member parents 
who have limited or no contact with the tribe.171  
Without a factual context, it is impossible to predict the outcome of the 
three remaining issues left undecided in Tanana. For future litigants, 
however, a potential answer to each question is best discerned by 
reference to ICWA.   
With respect to the parental objections to tribal court jurisdiction, 
that notion springs from ICWA’s provision permitting a parental veto 
over ICWA’s mandatory state court-to-tribal court transfer provision.172 
In ICWA Congress set out to enhance and strengthen tribal interests, not 
to curtail them.173 As a result, there is no statutory foundation for 
construing ICWA’s limitation on court-to-court transfers as a limitation 
on the exercise of inherent tribal jurisdiction. Inherent tribal jurisdiction 
is not rooted in ICWA. Not surprisingly, in thirty years no court has 
ever relied on subsection 1911(b)’s court-to-court parental veto provision 
to create a new limitation on the inherent authority of tribal courts to 
protect tribal children when initiating child protection cases.   
As for jurisdictional questions, nothing in ICWA impacts the right 
of any parent (or any other litigant, for that matter) to raise personal or 
other jurisdictional objections before a tribal court. To the extent a tribal 
court acts in derogation of a parent’s due process rights, the resulting 
decree will not be entitled to full faith and credit or comity 
recognition.174   
 
 169.  Id. at 751−52. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id. at 752. 
 172.  See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (2006). 
 173.  See supra text accompanying notes 84–85. 
 174.  See Starr v. George, 175 P.3d 50, 55 (Alaska 2008) (“Full faith and credit 
also requires that the issuing court afford the parties due process and render its 
judgment in accordance with federal and state constitutional standards.”); Evans 
v. Native Vill. of Selawik IRA Council, 65 P.3d 58, 60 (Alaska 2003); John v. 
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The issue of personal jurisdiction over a non-member parent is best 
discerned from ICWA’s jurisdictional scheme, which appropriately 
focuses on the status of the child at the heart of any court proceeding 
and not the identities of other parties (or potential parties).175 Similarly, 
state law provides an exception to personal jurisdiction of an absent or 
non-consenting parent based on the “status exception” of a child in a 
custody proceeding.176 When a child is a tribal member, typically one or 
both parents will be members too.177 Neither tribal jurisdiction under 
ICWA §§ 1911(a) and (b), nor ICWA § 1911(d)’s requirement to extend 
full faith and credit to tribal proceedings, is subject to an exception 
based on the membership status of a party other than the child.   
Finally, ICWA’s jurisdictional scheme does not distinguish between 
those tribal children who have significant contacts with their member 
tribe and those who do not. By its terms, ICWA applies to any Indian 
child who is a “member of an Indian tribe or is eligible for membership 
in an Indian tribe,” notwithstanding a tribe’s contacts with the child.178  
Nonetheless, “minimum contacts” is a constitutional prerequisite for the 
assertion of personal jurisdiction in state and federal fora.179 Personal 
jurisdiction questions are therefore likely to form a fertile basis for 
challenging tribal court jurisdiction where member children or their 
parents have limited or no contact with the tribe. 
 
Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 763 (Alaska 1999) (noting the “requirement that a tribal 
court possess personal jurisdiction over litigants appearing before it”). 
 175.  See Kaltag Tribal Council v. Jackson, Case No. 3:06-cv-00211 TMB, at 10 
(D. Alaska filed Feb. 22, 2008), aff’d, 344 Fed. App’x 324 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 66 (2010) (explaining that in determining a tribal court’s 
jurisdiction, “it is the membership of the child that is controlling, not the 
membership of the individual parents”); see also John, 982 P.2d at 759 (“A tribe’s 
inherent sovereignty to adjudicate internal domestic custody matters depends 
on the membership or eligibility for membership of the child.”). 
 176.  S.B. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Social Servs., 61 P.3d 6, 14 (Alaska 2002) 
(citing Balestrieri v. Maliska, 622 So. 2d 561, 562–64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)) 
(concluding that personal jurisdiction is not required to make an out-of-state 
parent a party to a state court custody case). 
 177.  See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2006) (defining “Indian Child” as “any 
unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an 
Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the 
biological child of a member of an Indian tribe”). 
 178.  See id. 
 179.  See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (finding that 
the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires minimum 
contacts with the forum state). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Alaska Supreme Court has affirmed the inherent jurisdiction of 
tribes in Alaska, concurrent with the State, to initiate ICWA-defined 
child custody proceedings, both inside and outside of Indian country. 
Resolving thirty years of contentious litigation, the existence and 
inherent sovereignty of federally recognized Alaska Native tribes is now 
a matter of settled law. With the law clarified by the Tanana decision, the 
State of Alaska and Alaska Native tribes can again work cooperatively 
in recognition of their shared jurisdiction over proceedings involving 
tribal children. 
 
